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SOME NO!lliS ON METHODS OF ASSESSING TGR!CICAL SEPARATION STANIIARDS 
By W i l l i a m  Gracey 
NASA Iangley Research Ce 
For q part  i n  this discussion, I would l i k e  t o  t a l k  about some of the 
methods that have been used t o  evaluate ver t ica l  separation standards. As 
shown i n  Figure 1, these methods include the ver t ica l  separation-loss method 
used by ICAO and IATA, the coll ision probability method, an error summation 
method,,and the f l i g h t  operational method used by IATA over the North Atlantic. 
As a background f o r  this discussion, I would l i ke  f i r s t  t o  define the errors 
tha t  must be considered i n  the application of  these methods; I would then l i ke  
t o  indicate w h a t  we know of the magnitudes of these errors fo r  the a l t i tude  
range of 30,000 t o  40,000 fee t .  
Figure 2 shows that the amount by which the cruise f l i gh t  level  of an a i r -  
plane i s  displaced from i ts  assigned a l t i tude- i s  due t o  the system error,  which 
is  the combined value of the instrument error and thiz G ~ z ? A c = ~ ~ s s ~ P  error. 
The static-pressure error  i s  made up of a fixed error (which i s  the error  that 
applies t o  a given ty-pe of a i rc raf t ,  tha t  is, the value i n  the f l i gh t  manual) 
and a variable error (which i s  the difference between the actual error  of an 
individual airplane and the value i n  the f l igh t  manual). 
error  is  a measure of  the random deviations of the airplane about i t s  cruise 
f l i gh t  level  and the sum of this and the system error i s  the overall  altimetry 
error.  
The f l i g h t  technical 
The magnitude of the instrument error can vary, depending on the ty-pe of 
altimeter and on whether a correction i s  applied fo r  the scale error. 
f ixed static-pressure error  can also be corrected, e i ther  manually o r  by com- 
puter, and the  value of the residual error w i l l  depend on which method i s  used. 
The 
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The variable static-pressure error i s  generally not known and so cannot be cor- 
rected. 
part ,  on whether the airplane i s  flown manually or  by autopilot. 
The magnitude of the f l igh t  technical error w i l l  depend, for  the most 
I n  considering these errors with respect t o  an assigned a l t i tude  separa- 
tion, we first need a measure of the overall  altimetry error  that would be 
representative of a l l  of the a i rc raf t  that  might operate within a common a l t i -  
tude range. We then need t o  know how these errors should be combined fo r  a i r -  
craft  flying adjacent f l i g h t  levels. Because of the diff icul ty  of determining 
the overall altimetry errors of a large number of a i r c ra f t  under routine oper- 
ating conditions, an attempt was f i r s t  made by ICAO t o  determine the magnitude 
of the individual errors and then t o  combine them by s t a t i s t i c a l  procedures. 
. 
Figure 3 shows the values tha t  were assigned t o  the individual errors by 
ICAO f o r  an a l t i tude  of 40,000 fee t  (refs. 1 and 2 ) .  
assumed t o  have normal distribution and t o  have a value of 36,  where 
standard deviation of  the error. 
i s  considered to  represent the probable maximum value of the error;  t h i s  i s  the 
error that would be equaled o r  exceeded i n  0.3 percent of the cases o r  i n  three 
cases i n  a thousand. 
Each of the errors i s  
u i s  the 
The significance of this 3a value i s  that  it 
The instrument error  i s  that of a precision alt imeter not corrected for  
the scale e r ror ,  which, a t  t h i s  a l t i tude,  has a specified tolerance of 
230 feet .  
residual error tha t  would remain when manual corrections a re  made using correc- 
t ion cards. 
computers that apply corrections f o r  both the instrument scale error  and the 
fixed error, these two values can be reduced t o  80 feet fo r  an a l t i tude  of 
40,000 f ee t  (ref.  3 ) .  
The value of the fixed static-pressure error  i s  the estimated 
I would l i ke  t o  point out here that, with the best of present-day 
The variable static-pressure e r ror  i s  an estimated value 
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based on rather limited information. 
i s  based on t e s t s  i n  which a tabulation was made of the number and magnitude 
of 'the a l t i tude deviations from the cruise f l igh t  level. 
The value of the f l i gh t  technical error 
In more recent t e s t s  by the NASA, the time his tor ies  of a l t i tude  deviations 
were evaluated i n  terms of the deviation that would be equaled o r  exceeded f o r  
0 . 3  percent of the cruise time. Because of the inclusion of the time element, 
we believe that this cr i ter ion represents a more meaningful measure of coll ision 
exposure than the probability of reaching a given al t i tude deviation. 
On Figure 4, I have shown the NASA data that were obtained fo r  routine 
a i r l i ne  operations under autopilot control in the a l t i tude  range u'p t o  
40,OOO f ee t  (ref.  4). 
craf t  and those on the right are  f o r  the turbojets. 
30,000 t o  40,000 feet ,  the maximum value f o r  the 10 Je ts  w a s  225 feet .  This 
means that, f o r  99.7 percent of t h e i r  cruise times, a l l  of the j e t s  operated 
within %Z>, o r  less ,  of t he i r  cruise flight levels. An impOI-taui ;Ifferezze 
between the data of this investigation and those of the previous studies f r o m  
which the E A 0  value was derived i s  the fact  that the distributions of the NASA 
data were not normal, but rather were of a t y p e  that included a l t i tude  devia- 
t ions as large as 3 t o  4 times the maximumvalue shown here. 
large deviations occurred a t  a greater frequency than would be the case i f  the 
data had been normally distributed. 
The data on the l e f t  are  f o r  piston and turboprop a i r -  
For the a l t i tude  range of 
I n  addition, these 
Figure 5 shows how the errors that were given on Figure 3 are  combined by 
the  ve r t i ca l  separation-loss method used by ICAO and IATA. 
have plot ted one-half of the normal distributions of the instrument, s ta t ic -  
pressure, and flight technical errors f r o m  one side of an assigned alt i tude.  
The 3cf values of each of the errors are  scaled t o  an assigned separation of 
On this figure, I 
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1000 feet.  
dure, the overall  altimetry error  for  one a i rc raf t  becomes 620 feet ,  and when 
two 620-foot errors a re  combined by the same procedure, the overall  error  for' 
two aircraf t  becomes 875 feet.  This value i s  considered t o  represent the loss 
i n  ver t ical  Separation tha t  would be equaled o r  exceeded 3 times i n  a thousand. 
When th i s  875-foot value i s  compared t o  the 1000-foot separation and an allow- 
ance of 50 f ee t  i s  made fo r  the s ize  of the a i rc raf t ,  there remains an actual 
separatton, o r  margin of safety, of 75 feet .  
the probability of collision; it only s ta tes  that the actual separation W i l l  
be 75 feet  o r  less  for  a probability of 3 i n  one thousand. 
When these three errors are  combined by the root-mean-square proce- 
This analysis s a y s  nothing about 
On Figure 6, I have shown the same 620-foot error f o r  each of two a i rc raf t  
with the normal distributions plotted from assigned al t i tudes 1000 fee t  apart. 
For this arrangement of the normal curves, the probability of coll ision can be 
computed from the probabili t ies that the errors of the two a i r c ra f t  would place 
them wi th in  each of the 50-foot segments fo r  which the two curves overlap 
(ref.  5) .  
placement in  a ver t ica l  direction, would be 190 per million. 
f o r  every million cases where two a i r c ra f t  are  along a ve r t i ca l  l i ne  with an 
assigned separation of 1000 fee t ,  190 col l is ions would occur. 
For this 3u value of 620 fee t ,  the coll ision probability, f o r  dis- 
This means that, 
Figure 7 shows how the coll ision probabili ty varies with overal l  altimetry 
error for  an assigned al t i tude separation of'1000 fee t  and an a i r c ra f t  s ize  of 
50 feet .  
10 per million and fo r  an error of 450 f e e t  the probability i s  reduced t o  about 
1 per million. These values apply Qnly t o  the ver t ica l  separation case so that 
the actual probability of coll ision would presumably be much smaller since it 
For an altimetry error  of 500 fee t ,  the col l is ion probability i s  about 
~~ ~ 
I 
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would include the coll ision probabili t ies for lateral and longitudinal separa- 
tion. 
altimetry error t o  a value less  than one-half the separation m i n i m .  
' 
This analysis shows the importance, however, of reducing the overall  
On Figure 8, I have examined the possibi l i ty  of achieving overall  altimetry 
1 %  
errors less than 500 feet a t  an a l t i tude  of 40,000 f ee t  on the basis of our 
present capability f o r  automatic correction of the instrument and fixed s ta t ic -  
pressure errors and i n  the  l igh t  of our present knowledge of the f l i g h t  tech- 
I 
I 
nical  error. 
bined as a system er ror  since, f o r  this case, I have assumed the use of a 
servo-correction system f o r  correcting both of the errors. 
correction error is  80 fee t  and the variable error  of the static-pressure 
system is  the same 250-foot value tha t  w a s  estimated by ICAO; the  root-mean- 
square combination of these errors yields a system error  of 262 feet .  
f l i gh t  technical error  i s  the maximum value (i.e., 225 f ee t )  that was measured 
f o r  t i e  Jet traisp~rts iz the K.3.A st.--i-Cjyv- 
i s  not normally distributed, it cannot be combined with the system error  by the 
root-mean-square procedure. For t h i s  reason, I have taken the much more con- 
servative approach and have added the two errors directly as  shown on Figure 8. 
Although the  result ing value i s  l e s s  than 500 fee t ,  I would l i ke  t o  emphasize 
tha t  t h i s  result i s  based on the assumptions that: 
pressure errors  of a l l  a i rc raf t  are, i n  fact ,  normally distributed with a 
31s value of 250 feet ,  (2) the fixed static-pressure errors of a l l  a i r c ra f t  
types a re  determined with an accuracy such that the corrections f o r  these errors 
and the  instrument errors  can be represented by a 3u value of 80 feet, and ( 3 )  
the  large f l i g h t  technical errors tha t  were found i n  the NASA study can be 
reduced t o  values approaching the 223-foot value shown here (ref.  6). 
Here the instrument and the static-pressure errors have been com- 
The value of the  
The 
Since t h i s  f l i gh t  technical error  
(1) the variable s ta t ic -  
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Figure 9 shows the resul ts  of the vertical-separation study tha t  was con- 
ducted i n  1963 by the a i r l ines  over the North Atlantic ( ref .  7). On the basis 
of t h i s  study, UTA concluded that  overall altimetry errors less  than 500 fee t  
are  being realized with present equipment i n  the a l t i tude  range between 30,000 
and 40,000 feet .  The system errors i n  t h i s  study were measured with altimeter 
systems that were both servo and manually corrected but with the majority of 
measurements being obtained from servo-corrected systems. 
of 312 feet  would, thus, appear t o  be i n  reasonable agreement with the 262-foot 
value assmed f o r  a servo-correction system i n  the analysis of Figure 8. 
f l i gh t  technical errors, however, were derived from measurements w i t h  the a i r -  
c ra f t  i n  steady f l igh t  and, for  t h i s  reason, I would question whether the dis- 
tr ibution of these f l i gh t  technical errors (from which a 3a value of 190 fee t  
was deduced) would include the large a l t i tude  deviations tha t  were found i n  the 
NASA study. 
’ 
The measured value 
The 
On the basis of t h i s  review, it i s  apparent tha t  an assessment of a ver t i -  
ca l  separation standard w i l l  depend on the values assigned t o  the individual 
errors, on the procedure used t o  combine the errors,  and on the manner i n  which 
the overall error  i s  considered i n  reference t o  the separation standard. From 
the standpoint of conservatism, it would appear tha t  the system error  and the 
f l igh t  technical error should be combined by simple summation and tha t  the 
resulting overall  error  should be compared t o  the separation standard i n  terms 
of collision probability. Finally, from the standpoint of minimizing coll ision 
risk, the overall  errors of a l l  a i r c ra f t  should be kept t o  values l e s s  than 
one-half the separation standard regardless of the probabi l i t ies  of coll ision 
fo r  l a t e ra l  and longitudinal separation. 
- 7 -  
REFERENCES 
1. Anon.: Summary of the Work of the Vertical Separation Panel. VS P-WP/57, 
Int. Civ. Aviation Organization (Montreal), Feb. 13, 1961. 
2. Anon.: Altimetry and the Vertical Separation of Aircraft. Int'l. Air 
Transport Assoc. (Montreal), Jan. 1960. 
3. Anon.: Computer, Transducer, Altitude, Altitude Ehcoding, Ty-pe ~~u-46 ( )/A. 
Military Specification MILC-2@89/1 (USAF), Sept. 23, 1963. 
MILC-2@89/1, July 20, 1962.) 
(Supersedes 
4. Kolnick, Joseph J., and Bentley, Barbara S.  : Random Deviations From Stabi- 
lized Cruise Altitudes of Commercial Transports at Altitudes Up to 40,000 
Feet With Autopilot in Altitude Hold. NASA TN D-1950, 1963. 
5. Gracey, W.: Analysis of the Effect of Altimeter-System Accuracy on Collision 
Probability. NASA TN D-1627, 1963. 
6 .  Gracey, W.: Recent Developments iii P r z s s - ~ e  !.ltdmetl.ry. Presented at the 
AIAA Mrst Annual Meeting and Technical Display, Washington, D.C. ,  
June 29 - July 2, 1964. 
7. Report on Vertical Separation Study - North Atlantic Region - July 15th - 
September 3Oth, 1963. 
March 1964. 
International Air Tramp. Assn. DOC.GEm/l~l, 
cn cn 
9 
z 
0 
2 
W cn 
-I 
0 
c 
a 
-
ir 
W > 
e 
CL 
A 
0 
0 
e 
E 
0 
tr 
tr 
W 
e 
rn a 
0 
al 
9 
a 
-P c 
a, a rn .. 
rn 
s rn 
a 
E: 
0 
rl 
-P a 
k 
rl 
.rl 
-P 
k 
9 
8 
I 
rl 
. 
h 
J 
3 
2 
z 
I- 
I 
(3 
J 
LL 
a 
a 
W U 
J rn n 
X 5 cs U 
W 
s 
W 
J 
m 
k 
0 
k 
k 
a, 
x 
k 
[r w 
5 a 
a 
J 
J 
rr 
W > 
0 
Q) 
k 
m 
a, 
k 
pc 
I 
cu 
2 
b 
rr) 
n cn 
W 
I- cn 
W 
0 a 
0 - 
W 
z c 
in z -
0 0  
LnLn 
N 
0 
0 
A 
6 
i II tI b b  rc) 
4J 
al 
al 
k 
0 
0 
0 - 
0 
f 
-P 
Ld 
rn 
k 
0 
k 
k w 
I 
rr\ 
Q) 
2 
2 
. 
. 
v) cr 
I 
0 
I 
W 
3 + 
n 
a 
7 
x 
4 
rr) 3 0 
X 
u) 
M 
Ln 
% 
LL 
wi 
00 
C U I  c 
0 -
Ln 
0 
m 
k 
0 
k 
k 
a, 
” 
I- 
LL 
0 
0 
0 
Tj- 
0” 
G 
cn 
E 
0 ar ar 
W 
b 
rr) + 
7 
0 
[r 
W 
v> 
5i 
8 
t. rr 
I- 
W z -
!i 
arr 
v> 
a 
Jrr 
JO 
rrE w w  
(II 
01 
0 
rl 
c 
0 
.rl 
-P 
E 
rl 
(d 
0 
, 
I- 
LL 
0 
0 
0 
0- 
Y f  
5;; 
Y 
cn 
[r 
0 ar ar 
W 
b 
rr) + 
111 
0 
[r 
[r 
W 
> 
111 
I- 
W 
=I- 
FLL 2: 
c 
0 
1-I 
rn 
1-I 
d 
rl 
0 u 
I 
\D 
I I  
W 
N * 
-J 
0 
L 
a - 
I-I- 
ab- 
w O  
'0 
I- 
IL 
a 
0 a 
a 
a - 
(0 
I 
0, 
0 
0 
-L  
0 a 
[y: 
0- I-
a 
c 1 W 
0 
0 
0 i 
x> 0 0 0 0 
0 0 + o  -0 0 0 * 0 Ln Fr) zl-cu 
u 
k 
0 
k 
x x 
2 2 
Po 
k 
PI 
al 
2 
4 
I- 
LL 
K 
0 
a 
a 
55 
3 
a 
a 
- 
a 
W 
r, 
3 
0 
a 
W 
t 
W 
t- 
v) > cn 
E: 
0 
d 
4 
I rn 
k 
0 
I 
a 
I 
5 
-LL 
(3 
L 
I- 
LL 
c cn 
W 
3 
-I 
> a 
a a 
m 
b 
rr) 
h 
I- 
LL 
LT 
0 
LT 
a 
a 
- 
- 
W 
u3 
[r 
0 
LT 
LT 
W 
1 
0 
z 
I 
0 
W 
I- 
a 
I- 
I 
(3 
_I 
LL 
- 
a 
0 
a, 
3 
E 
rl 
(d 
I 
o\ 
- 
t- 
J a 
-l 
-l 
LT 
W > 
0 
a 
8 
NASA-Langley, 1965 
